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Chapter I -- How many kinds of King's son lands there are, and by what means they are gotten


All states, all powers, that have gripped and keep rule over men have been and are either nations with Presidents or King's son lands.

King's son lands are either handed down in family line, in which the family has been long put up; or they are new.

The new are either entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or they are, as it were, members added to the state handed down in family line of the King's son who has gotten them, as was the country with a king of Naples to that of the King of Spain.

Such dominions thus gotten are either gotten used to live under a King's son, or to live being free; and are gotten either by the arms of the King's son himself, or of others, or else by great amount of money or by power.

Chapter II -- About King's son lands handed down in the family line


I will let go of all discussion on nations with Presidents, inasmuch as in another place I have written of them end to end, and will talk myself only to King's son lands. In doing so I will keep to the order indicated over, and have a discussion about how such King's son lands are to be ruled and kept safe.

I say at once there are fewer difficulties in property handed down in family line conditions, positions, and those long gotten used to the family of their King's son, than new ones; for it is enough only not to go against the things generally done of his earlier beings in the family line, and to work thoughtfully with circumstances as they get up, for a King's son of mean powers to be supporting himself in his nation, unless he be kept without it by some special and more than enough force; and if he should be so kept without of it, whenever anything causing fear happens to the place-taker, he will get it back.

We have in Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara, who could not have put up with the attacks of the Venetians in '84, nor those of Pope Julius in '10, unless he had been long made certain in his dominions. For the position handed down in the family line of a King's son has less cause and less need to wound feelings; for this reason it happens that he will be more loved; and unless special consciously bad behaviors cause him to be hated, it is in harmony with reason to be of the opinion that that his subjects will be naturally well have a tendency in the direction of him; and in the days long past and time of his rule the memories and reasons that make for change are lost, for one change always lets go of the toothing for another.

Chapter III – About mixed King's son lands


But the difficulties take place in a new King's son land. And firstly, if it be not entirely new, but is, as it were, a part of a nation which, taken as a group, may be named made of different parts, the changes get up chiefly from a natural trouble which there is in all new King's son lands; for men change their rulers readily, hoping to better themselves, and this hope gets them to take up arms against him who rules: wherein they are tricked, because they after see by experience they have gone from bad to more bad. This follows also on another natural and common need, which always causes a new King's son to put a weighting on those who have given in to him with his military men and with unlimited other hard times which he must put upon his new property.

In this way you have persons hated in all those whom you have damaged in getting that King's son land, and you are not able to keep those friends who put you there because of your not being able to give what is desired, needed to them in the way they was of the opinion, and you cannot take strong measures against them, feeling joined to them. For, although one may be very strong in armed forces, yet in going in, coming in a country division one has always need of the goodwill of the persons living in the country.

For these reasons Louis the Twelfth, King of France, quickly took up Milan, and as quickly lost it; and to turn him out the first time it only needed Lodovico's own forces; because those who had opened the gates to him, decisions at law themselves tricked in their hopes of future help, would not put up with the ill-behaviour of the new King's son. It is very true that, after getting not readily controlled country divisions a second time, they are not so lightly lost after, because the King's son, with little unreadiness, takes the chance of the war against authority to punish the persons doing wrong, to clear out the persons likely of wrongdoing, and to make stronger himself in the most feeble places. Thus to cause France to not keep Milan the first time it was enough for the Duke Lodovico ( Duke Lodovico was Lodovico Moro, a son of Francesco Sforza, who married Beatrice d'Este. He ruled over Milan from 1494 to 1500, and died in 1510 ) to produce war against government (ruler) on the edges; but to cause him to not keep it a second time it was necessary to take the complete body everywhere against him, and that his armies should be made of no effect and driven out of Italy; which came after from the causes above said about.

Though that is so, Milan was taken from France both the first and the second time. The general reasons for the first have been had a discussion about; it remains to name those for the second, and to see what resources he had, and what any one in his place, position would have had for be supporting himself more safely in his property than did the King of France.

Now I say that those dominions which, when gotten, are added to an old nation by him who gets them, are either of the same country and language, or they are not. When they are, it is simpler, painless to keep them, especially when they have not been gotten used to self-government; and to keep them safely it is enough to have made waste to the family of the King's son who was ruling them; because the two groups of persons, keeping safe in other things the old conditions, and not being unlike in things generally done, will live quietly together, as one has seen in Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony, and Normandy, which have been joined to France for so long a time: and, although there may be some point or amount unlike in language, nevertheless the things generally done are the same, and the people will easily be able to get on among themselves. He who has added them, if he desires to keep them, has only to take in mind two thoughts: the one, that the family of their former ruler is put down; the other, that neither their laws nor their taxes are made a change, so that in a very short time they will become entirely one body with the old King's son land.

But when states are gotten in a country being unlike in language, things generally done, or laws, there are troubles, and good great amount of money and great energy are needed to put off them, and one of the greatest and most true, in fact helps would be that he who has gotten them should go and (be) living in, have house in there. This would make his position more not able to get loose and strong, as it has made that of the Turk in Greece, who, though all the other measures taken by him for holding that state, if he had not (made) certain, fixed there, would not have been able to keep it. Because, if one is on the place, diseases are seen as they spring up, and one can quickly put things right; but if one is not at hand, they are heard of only when they are great, and then one can no longer put things right. in addition to this, the country is not pillaged by your persons with public positions; the subjects are made free from doubt by quick use of to the King's son; in this way, desiring to be good, they have more cause to love him, and desiring to be in other way, to fear him. He who would attack that nation from the outside must have the best make conscious of danger; as long as the King's son is living in, has house in there it can only be pulled violently from him with the greatest trouble.

The other and better direction taken is to send colonies to one or two places, which may be as keys to that nation, for it is necessary either to do this or else to keep there a great number of military horsemen and army on foot. A King's son does not make payments of much on colonies, for with little or no money used, needed, for something he can send them out and keep them there, and he wounds (feeling) only the small of 2 groups of the citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give them to the new persons living (in a place); and those whom he wounds (feeling), still in the same way poor and with much space between, are never able to damage him; while the rest being not damaged are easily kept quiet, and at the same time are all troubled not to make an error for fear it should come about to them as it has to those who have been despoiled. In reasoned opinion, I say that these colonies are not high priced, of great value, they are more true to, they damage less, and the damaged, as has been said, being poor and with much space between, cannot do damage. upon this, one has to make note that men rightly would either to be well gave attention to or crushed, because they can get themselves even of lighter wounds, of more serious ones they cannot; therefore the physical damage that is to be done to a man rightly would to be of such a kind that one does not get up in fear of to get even.

But in be supporting armed men there in place of colonies one spends much more, having to waste on the military station in town all the income from the nation, so that the getting turns into a loss, and many more are made angry, because the complete body state is damaged; through the making change in position of the military station in town up and down all become knowledgeable with no comfort, and all become violent, and they are persons hated against who, while overcome on their own land, are yet able to do damage. For every reason, as an outcome of that, such guards are as of no use as a colony is useful.

Again, the King's son who holds a country being unlike in the above respects rightly would to make himself the head and supporter of his less powerful persons living near, and to make more feeble the more powerful among them, taking care that no stranger as powerful as himself will, by any error, get a safe position there; for it will always come about that such a one will be introduced by those who are not pleased, either through more than enough of desire to go far or through fear, as one has seen up to now. The Romans were brought into Greece by the Aetolians; and in every other country where they got a safe position they were brought in by the persons living (in a place). And the general direction taken of affairs is that, as soon as a powerful stranger goes in, comes in a country, all the controlled states are pulled to him, moved by the feeling hate which they sense against the ruling power. So that in respect to those controlled states he has not to take any trouble to get them over to himself, for the complete body of them quickly come together to the nation which he has gotten there. He has only to take care that they do not get keep of too much power and too much authority, and then with his own forces, and with their goodwill, he can easily keep down the more powerful of them, so in connection with keep being in entirely chief in the country. And he who does not rightly manage this business will soon not keep what he has gotten, and while he does keep it he will have without end difficulties and troubles.

The Romans, in the countries which they added, observed closely these measures; they sent colonies and kept up friendly relations with ( * ) the unimportant powers, without increasing their power; they kept down the greater, and did not let any strong out-of-country powers to get authority. Greece appears to me enough for an example. The Achaeans and Aetolians were kept friendly by them, the country with a king of Macedonia was made less important, Antiochus was driven out; yet the merits of the Achaeans and Aetolians never got for them authority to increase their power, nor did getting to of Philip ever get the Romans to be his friends without first making him less important, nor did the effect of Antiochus make them be in agreement that he should keep any chief over the country. Because the Romans did in these instances what all taking care, wise King's sons rightly would to do, who have to look upon not only present troubles, but also future ones, for which they must get ready with every energy, because, when seen before it does, it is simple, not hard to put things right; but if you wait until they come near, the medical substance is no longer in time because the disease has become not possible to make well; for it happens in this, as the medical men and women say it happens in violent overheated sign of disease, that in the starting of the disease it is simple, not hard to make well but hard to made discovery of, but in the direction taken of time, not having been either sensed or gave attention to in the starting, it becomes simple, not hard to made discovery of but hard to make well. This it happens in affairs of state, for when the badly, wrong, bad things that gets up have been seen before it does (which it is only given to a wise man to see), they can be quickly put right, but when, through not having been seen before it does, they have been permitted to grow in a way that everyone can see them, there is no longer a way of putting things right. as an outcome of that, the Romans, seeing before it does troubles, dealt with them at once, and, even to keep from a war, would not let them come to a head, for they knew that war is not to be kept out of the way of, but is only to be put off to the better chance of others; in addition they wished to fight with Philip and Antiochus in Greece so as not to have to do it in Italy; they could have kept out of the way of the two, but this they did not desire; nor did that ever please them which is forever in the mouths of the wise ones of our time: -- Let us get pleasure out of the benefits of the time -- but rather the benefits of their own free from fear and good sense, for time drives everything before it, and is able to take with it good as well as wrongdoing, and wrongdoing as well as good.

( * ) See statement, saying in the opening part on the word "intrattenere."

But let us turn to France and question whether she has done any of the things said-about. I will say of Louis ( * ) (and not of Charles) (+) as the one whose acts, behavior is the better to be observed, he having gripped of Italy for the longest time; and you will see that he has done the opposite to those things which rightly would to be done to keep a state controlled, untroubled of some parts.


( * ) Louis XII, King of France, "The Father of the persons in general," born 1462, died 1515.

(+) Charles VIII, King of France, born 1470, died 1498.

King Louis was brought into Italy by the desire to go far of the Venetians, who desired to get half the nation of Lombardy by his coming between groups. I will not make a protest the direction taken by the king, because, desiring to get a foot in Italy, and having no friends there -- seeing rather that every door was shut to him being in debt to the acts, behavior of Charles -- he was forced to take in those friendships which he could get, and he would have done well, gone well very quickly in his design if in other matters he had not made some errors, wrong opinions or acts. The king, however, having gotten Lombardy, got back at once the authority which Charles had lost: Genoa gave in; the Florentines became his friends; the Marquess of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, the Bentivogli, my woman of Forli, the over much air of authority of Faenza, of Pesaro, of Rimini, of Camerino, of Piombino, the Lucchese, the Pisans, the Sienese -- everybody made moves-forward to him to become his friend. Then could the Venetians take note for the foolishness of the direction taken by them, which, in order that they might safe, certain two towns in Lombardy, had made the king chief of two-thirds of Italy.

Let any one now take into account with what little trouble the king could have kept up his position in Italy had he observed the rules above put down, and kept all his friends safe (out of danger); for although they were a great number of they were both not so strong and full of fear, some in fear of the Church, some of the Venetians, and thus they would always have been forced to support in with him, and by their means he could easily have made himself safe against those who remained powerful. But he was no sooner in Milan than he did the opposite by giving help to Pope Alexander to take up the Romagna. It never occurred to him that by this acting he was making more feeble himself, keeping from having himself of friends and of those who had put on without care themselves into his knees when seated, while he greater sized the Church by making an addition of much time-limited power to the thought source, thus giving it greater authority. And having made oneself responsible this first in rating error, he was made to come after it up, so much so that, to put an end to the desire to go far of Alexander, and to put a stop to his becoming the chief of Tuscany, he was himself forced to come into Italy.

And as if it were not enough to have greater sized the Church, and kept himself without friends, he, desiring to have the country with a king of Naples, makes a division of it with the King of Spain, and where he was the first in rating judge in Italy he takes an get together, so that the strongly desiring of that country and the unhappy persons of his own should have somewhere to keep safe; and in view of the fact that he could have left in the country with a king his own person receiving regular payments after years of work as king, he drove him out, to put one there who was able to make go him, Louis, out in turn.

The desire to become owner of is in truth very natural and common, and men always do so when they be able to, and for this they will be praised not made responsible; but when they cannot do so, yet desire to do so by any way possible, then there is being foolish and responsible. as an outcome of that, if France could have attacked Naples with her own forces she rightly would to have done so; if she could not, then she rightly would not to have made a division it. And if the division into parts which she made with the Venetians in Lombardy was let off that by it she got a foot-in in Italy, this other division into parts had a right to responsibility, for it had not the let off of that need.

As an outcome of that, Louis made these five errors: he put an end to the unimportant powers, he increased the power of one of the greater powers in Italy, he brought in a out-of-country power, he did not come to rest in the country, he did not send colonies. which errors, had he lived, were not enough to damage him had he not made a sixth by taking away their dominions from the Venetians; because, had he not greater sized the Church, nor brought Spain into Italy, it would have been very good-sensed and necessary to acting as if unimportant them; but having first taken these steps, he rightly would never to have gave agreement to their serious damage, for they, being powerful, would always have kept off others from designs on Lombardy, to which the Venetians would never have gave agreement except to become chiefs, rulers, persons in control themselves there; also because the others would not desire to take Lombardy from France in order to give it to the Venetians, and to run bit for recording points to both they would not have had the power of controlling fear.

And if anyone should say: "King Louis gave in the Romagna to Alexander and the country with a king to Spain to keep from war," I responsible for the reasons given above that a error rightly would never to be carried out to keep from war, because it is not to be kept out of the way of, but is only put off to a later time to your unhelpful. And if another should put forward the undertaking which the king had given to the Pope that he would help him in the undertaking, in exchange for the coming to an end of his condition of being married ( * ) and for the hat to Rouen, (+) to that I (give) answer what I shall write later on about the Faith of King's sons, and how it rightly would to be kept.

( * ) Louis XII unmarried his married woman, Jeanne, daughter of Louis XI, and married in 1499 Anne of Brittany, woman not married again of Charles VIII, in order to keep the Duchy of Brittany for the ruler.

(+) The Archbishop of Rouen. He was Georges d'Amboise, made come into existence a King's son of church by Alexander VI. Born 1460, died 1510.

Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having came after by any of the conditions observed by those who have taken control of countries and wished to keep them. and not is there any strange event in this, but much that is good-sensed and quite natural. And on these matters I spoke at Nantes with Rouen, when Valentino, as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope Alexander, was usually named, took up the Romagna, and on King's son of church Rouen observing to me that the Italians did not get it clearly war, I replied to him that the French did not get it clearly state-arts, that is that otherwise they would not have let the Church to get to such being great. And in fact is has been seen that the being great of the Church and of Spain in Italy has been caused by France, and her damaged thing may be given to them. From this a general rule is pulled which never or uncommonly becomes feeble: that he who is the cause of another becoming powerful is caused serious damage; because that chief importance has been brought about either by sharpness or else by force, and both are had doubts about by him who has been got made to power.


Chapter IV -- why the country with a king of DARIUS, overcame by Alexander, did not take arms against the agent coming after Alexander at his death


Giving thought to as the difficulties which men have had to keep to a newly gotten state, some might question how, seeing that Alexander the Great became the chief of Asia in a few years, and died while it was hardly (made) certain, fixed (from where it might come into view as good-sensed that the complete body empire would have taken to arms), nevertheless his agent coming after supported themselves, and had to meet no other trouble than that which arose among themselves from their own desires.

I answer that the King’s son lands of which one has record are discovered to be ruled in two different ways; either by a Prince, with a body of lowly workers, who help him to control the country with a king as ministers by his way and authority; or by a Prince and men of high birth, who keep that self-respect by days long past of blood and not by the Grace of the Prince. Such men of high birth have states and their own persons, who take them in as rulers and keep them in natural love. Those states that are ruled by a Prince and his servants keep their Prince in more thought, because in all the country there is no one who is took as having authority as higher to him, and if they give in supporting orders to another they do it in connection with a head of town church and officer, and they do not take him any detail, point love.

The examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and the King of France. The complete government by a ruler of the Turk is given government by one ruler, the others are his lowly workers; and, making separate his country with a king into Sanjaks, he sends there different controlling persons, and changes them as he selects. But the King of France is placed in the middle of an old body of rulers, given credit by their own persons, and loved one by them; they have their own right, nor can the king take these away except at his great danger. As an outcome of that, he who gives thought to both of these states will take in consciously great difficulties in getting the nation of the Turk, but, once it is overcame, great rest in keeping it. The causes of the difficulties in getting the country with a king of the Turk are that the place-taker cannot be named in by the Princes of the country with a king, nor can he hope to be given help in his designs by the disgust of those whom the ruler has around him. This comes about from the reasons given over; for his government representatives in another country, being all persons as property and bondmen, can only be gone bad with great trouble, and one can hope for little better chance from them when they have gone bad, as they cannot keep the people with them, for the reasons given. For this reason, he who attacks the Turk must take in mind that he will see him united, and he will have to be dependent more on his own power than on the disgust of others; but, if once the Turk has been overcame, and sent the way in the field in such a way that he cannot put back his armies, there is nothing to fear but the family of this Prince, and, this being destructed, there remains no one to fear, the others having no credit with the persons in general; and as the person taking over did not have belief in them before his good outcome, so he rightly would not to fear them after it.

The opposite happens in countries with kings ruled like that of France, because one can easily move into there by getting over some baron of the country with a king, for one always gets unhappy persons and such as desire a change. Such men, for the reasons given, can open the way into the nation and make the coming out best simple, not hard; but if you desire to keep it after, you meet with unlimited troubles, both from those who have given help you and from those you have crushed. And not is it enough for you to have destructed the family of the Prince, because the over much air of authority that keep being in make themselves the heads of new moving against you, and as you are unable either to please or destruct them, that state is lost whenever time takes the chance.

Now if you will take into account what was the nature of the government of Darius, you will see it like to the country with a king of the Turk, and therefore it was only necessary for Alexander, first to put an end to him in the field, and then to take the country from him. After which coming out best, Darius being put to death, the state remained safe to Alexander, for the above reasons. And if his agents coming after had been united they would have got pleasure out of it safely and at their rest, for there were no trouble made in the country with a king except those they were the cause of an outburst themselves.

But it is not possible to keep with such peace states constituted like that of France. for this reason arose those frequent uses of force against government against the Romans in Spain, France, and Greece, being in debt to the many King’s son lands there were in these countries, nations, governments, of which, as long as the memory of them had ongoing existence, the Romans always held a unsafe property; but with the power and long going-on of the empire the memory of them passed away, and the Romans then became safe, certain owners. And when fighting after among themselves, each one was able to make a join to himself his own parts of the country, according to the authority he had taken to be true there; and the family of the former ruler being destructed, none other than the Romans were given credit.

When these things are put or kept in mind no one will say is great thing at the comfort with which Alexander held the Empire of Asia, or at the difficulties which others have had to keep a property, such as Pyrrhus and many more; this is not caused by the little or the more than enough of power to in the person taking over, but by the need of equality in the controlled state.


Chapter V -- about the way to rule cities or KING’S SON LANDS which lived under their own laws before they were added


Whenever those states which have been gotten as stated have been gotten used to live under their own laws and in being free, there are three courses for those who desire to keep them: the first is to serious damage them, the next is to be living in, have house in there in person, the third is to let them to live under their own laws, doing a payment, and putting up within it an oligarchy which will keep it friendly to you. Because such a government, being made come into existence by the Prince, knows that it cannot support without his friendship and interest, and does it best to support him; and therefore he who would keep a great town gotten used to being free will keep it more easily by the means of its own citizens than in any other way.

There are, for example, the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans kept Athens and Thebes, getting started there an oligarchy, nevertheless they lost them. The Romans, in order to keep Capua, Carthage, and Numantia, took them to bits, and did keep them. They wished to keep Greece as the Spartans kept it, making it free and letting its laws, and did not go well. So to keep it they were forced to take away many cities in the country, for in truth there is no safe way to keep them otherwise than by destructing them. And he who becomes chief of a great town gotten used to being free and does not put an end to it, may be of the opinion that to be made waste to by it, for in war against authority it has always the chief sign of condition of being free and its old privileges as a getting better point, which neither time nor benefits will ever cause it to overlook. And whatever you may do or make ready against, they never overlook that name or their privileges unless they are separated or went away, but at every chance they immediately come together to them, as Pisa after the hundred years she had been kept in prison conditions by the Florentines.

But when cities or countries are gotten used to live under a Prince, and his family is destructed, they, being on the one hand gotten used to do as ordered and on the other hand not having the old Prince, cannot be in agreement in making one from among themselves, and they do not have knowledge of how to rule themselves. For this reason they are very slow to take up arms, and a Prince can get nearer to them to himself and safe, certain them much more not hard, slowly, simply. But in nations with Presidents there is more (driving) force, greater feeling of hate, and more desire for punishment for wrongdoing, which will never let the memory of their former condition of being free to rest; so that the safest way is to put an end to them or to be living in, have house in there.


Chapter VI -- having a part in new KING’S SON LANDS which are gotten by one's own arms and power


Let no one be surprised if, in word-using of entirely new King’s son lands as I shall do, I put forward the highest examples both of Prince and of state; because men, walking almost always in paths overcome by others, and coming after by a copy their land ownership statements, are yet unable to keep entirely to the ways of others or get to the power of those they be copying in behavior. A wise man rightly would always to come after the paths overcome by great men, and to be copying in behavior those who have been highest, so that if his power to does not equal theirs, at least it will be tasting it. Let him act like the bright archers who, designing to do well with the mark which yet appears too far away, and having knowledge of the limits to which the power of their arch gets to, take direction much higher than the mark, not to get stretched by their power or arrow to so great a level, but to be able with the help of so high an try to be in touch the mark they desire to get.

I say, as an outcome of that, that in entirely new King’s son lands, where there is a new Prince, more or less trouble is discovered in keeping them, as agreement as there is more or less power to in him who has gotten the nation. Now, as the fact of becoming a Prince from a private station thinks either power to or great amount of money, it is clear that one or other of these things will make better in some degree many troubles. Though that is so, he who has been dependent on least on great amount of money is made certain the strongest. In addition, it helps matters when the Prince, having no other state, is forced to be living in, have house in there in person.

But to come to those who, by their own power to and not through great amount of money, have gotten up to be Princes, I say that Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, and such like are the most very good, of highest quality examples. And although one may not have a discussion Moses, he having been only one acting in the interests of a dead person of the will of highest being, yet he rightly would to be had high opinion of, if only for that way which made him good, kind to talk with highest being. But in giving thought to as Cyrus and others who have gotten or started countries with kings, all will be discovered very good; and if their one land ownership statements and control of business shall be gave thought to as, they will not be discovered of rough (poor) quality to those of Moses, although he had so great a teacher. And in putting questions to their actions and lives one cannot see that they owed anything to great amount of money beyond chance, which brought them the material to give form into which seemed best to them. Without that chance their powers of mind would have been put down, and without those powers the chance would have come in pointless.

It was necessary, as an outcome of that, to Moses that he should see the people of Israel in Egypt put in chains and kept under by force by the Egyptians, in order that they should be having tendency to come after him so as to be given out of prison conditions. It was necessary that Romulus should not keep being in Alba, and that he should be let go at his birth, in order that he should become King of Rome and starting person of the fatherland. It was necessary that Cyrus should see the Persians not pleased with with the government of the Medes, and the Medes soft and womanlike through their long peace. Theseus could not have given view of his power to had he not discovered the Athenians went away. These chances, as an outcome of that, made those men well-off and happily-placed, and their high ableness made them to take in the chance whereby their country was ennobled and made great, greatly respected.

Those who by fearless ways become Princes, like these men, become owner of a principality with trouble, but they keep it with comfort. The difficulties they have in getting it go higher in part from the new rules and methods which they are forced to put into use for first time to put up their government and its safety. And it rightly would to be put or kept in mind that there is nothing more hard to take in hand, more dangerous to guide, take, or more uncertain in its good outcome, then to take the lead in the first use of a new order of things. Because the direction guide has for persons hated against all those who have done well under the old conditions, and not very warm supporters in those who may do well under the new. This coldness comes about partly from fear of the ones against, who have the laws on their side, and partly from the disbelief of men, who do not readily have belief in new things until they have had a long experience of them. Thus it happens that whenever those who are violent have the chance to attack they do it like supporters, while the others put forward arguments not very warmly, in such wise that the Prince is put in danger in company with them.

It is necessary, as an outcome of that, if we desire to have a discussion this field of interest completely, to question whether these innovators can have belief on themselves or have to be dependent on others: that is to say, if, to make complete their undertaking, have they to use requests or can they use force? In the first example they always come after badly, and never give effect to (purpose) anything; but when they can have belief in themselves and use force, then they are uncommonly put in danger. For this reason it is that all armed ones who says of future events have overcame, and the unarmed ones have been made waste to. In addition to the reasons said-about, the nature of the people is not fixed in value, and while it is simple, not hard to get to them, it is hard to fix them in that getting to. And thus it is necessary to take such measures that, when they have belief no longer, it may be possible to make them have belief by force.

If Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus had been unarmed they could not have put into force (operation) their general laws of government for long -- as happened in our time to Fra Girolamo Savonarola, who was caused serious damage with his new order of things immediately the great number, mass had belief in him no longer, and he had no means of keeping tight those who had belief or of making the unbelievers to have belief. As an outcome of that such as these have great difficulties in completing their undertaking, for all their dangers are in the higher-going, yet with power to they will overcome them; but when these are overcome, and those who had desire for what another has them their good outcome are destructed, they will begin to be respected, and they will go on after powerful, safe, certain, given great respect, and happy.

To these great examples I desire to join a less than another one; still it comes with some lookalike to them, and I desire it to be enough me for all of a like kind: it is Hiero the Syracusan. (*) This man rose from a private station to be Prince of Syracuse, nor did he, one or the other, be in debt to anything to great amount of money but chance; for the Syracusans, being ruled cruelly, chose him for their chief, after he was rewarded by being made their Prince. He was of so great power to, even as a private person having rights in the nation, that one who writes of him says he wanted nothing but a country with a king to be a king. This man put an end to the old army men, put in a complete orderly way the new, gave up old agreement, made new ones; and as he had his own soldiers and nations joined together, on such bases he was able to make any building: in this way, while he had had ongoing existence much trouble in getting, he had but little in keeping.

( * ) Hiero II, born about 307 B.C., died 216 B.C.


Chapter VII -- having a part in new KING’S SON LANDS which are gotten either by the arms of others or by good chance event


Those who one and only by good chance event become Princes from being private citizens have little trouble in going higher, but much in keeping atop; they have not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they have many when they get to the top. Such are those to whom some state is given either for money or by the way of him who gives it; as happened to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of the Hellespont, where Princes were made by Darius, in order that they might keep the cities both for his safety and his respect given for great doings; as also were those great rulers who, by the wrong or changed form of the military men, from being citizens came to empire. Such support simply made higher upon the trading connections looked on as part of value of business and the great amount of money of him who has made higher them -- two most inconstant and changing things. Neither have they the knowledge necessary thing for the position; because, unless they are men of great value and power to, it is not good-sensed to be of the opinion that they should have knowledge how to order, having always lived in a private condition; in addition to, they cannot keep it because they have not forces which they can keep friendly and true to.

States that go higher suddenly, then, like all other things in nature which are born and grow quickly, cannot let go of their bases and likeness fixed in such a way that the first bad conditions will not put an end to them; if not, as is said, those who suddenly become Princes are men of so much ableness that they have knowledge they have to be got ready at once to keep that which great amount of money has put on without care into their legs-top and that those bases, which others have put down BEFORE they became Princes, They must make ready after.

"Le radici e corrispondenze," their roots (i.e. bases) and likenesses or relations with other states -- a common sense of "letters" and "likeness" in the 16th and 17th hundreds of years.

About these two methods of going higher to be a Prince by ableness or great amount of money, I desire to put forward two examples within our own memory, and these are Francesco Sforza and Cesare Borgia. Francesco, by right means and with great ableness from being a private person rose to be Duke of Milan, and that which he had gotten with a thousand troubles he kept with little trouble. On the other hand, Cesare Borgia, called by the people Duke Valentino, gotten his state during the higher-going of his father, and on its say no to he lost it, though that he had taken every measure and done all that rightly would to be done by a wise and able man to fix firmly his roots in the states which the arms and great amount of money of others had given on him.

Francesco Sforza, born 1401, died 1466. He married Bianca Maria Visconti, a natural daughter of Filippo Visconti, the Duke of Milan, on whose death he got his own getting-higher to the duchy. Machiavelli was the credited person acting for the Florentine Republic to Cesare Borgia (1478- 1507) during the bits of business which led up to the deaths by a violent attack of the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia, and in company with his letters to his chiefs in Florence he has left an account, written ten years before "The Prince," of the proceedings of the duke in his "Descritione del modo tenuto dal duca Valentino nello ammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli," etc., a move of which is put on (to) at the end to the present work.

Because, as is stated over, he who has not first put down his bases may be able with great power to make ready them after, but they will be put down with trouble to the buildings designer and danger to the building. If, as an outcome of that, all the steps taken by the duke be gave thought to as, it will be seen that he put down solid bases for his future power, and I do not take into account it unnecessary to have a discussion of them, because I do not have knowledge what better rules of behavior to give a new Prince than the example of his acts; and if his dispositions were of no use, that was not his errors, but the special and very much hate, desire to do damage of great amount of money.

Alexander the being number six in line, in desiring to make more important the duke, his son, had many nearest and forward looking troubles. Firstly, he did not see his way to make him chief of any state that was not a state of the Church; and if he was ready to do to take the Church he knew that the Duke of Milan and the Venetians would not give agreement, because Faenza and Rimini were already under the system of care for trade of the Venetians. In addition to this, he saw the arms of Italy, especially those by which he might have been given help, in hands that would fear the aggrandizement of the Pope, namely, the Orsini and the Colonnesi and their supporters. It was necessary to him, as an outcome of that, to trouble this state of affairs and mix up the powers, so in connection with make himself safely chief of part of their nations. This was simple, not hard for him to do, because he discovered the Venetians, moved by other reasons, had a tendency to take back the French into Italy; he would not only not be, fight against this, but he would make it more simple, not hard by ending the former condition of being married of King Louis. As an outcome of that the king came into Italy with the help of the Venetians and the give agreement of Alexander. He was no sooner in Milan than the Pope had soldiers from him for the attempt on the Romagna, which gave in to him on the general opinion of the king. The duke, as an outcome of that, having gotten the Romagna and overcome the Colonnesi, while desiring to keep that and to go forward farther, was slowed down by two things: the one, his forces did not come into view as true to him, the other, the goodwill of France: that is to say, he feared that the forces of the Orsini, which he was using, would not support to him, that not only might they get in the way of him from getting more, but might themselves get a grip what he had got, and that the king might also do the same. Of the Orsini he had a suggestion when, after taking Faenza and attacking Bologna, he saw them go very unwillingly to that attack. And in connection with the king, he learned his mind when he himself, after taking the Duchy of Urbino, attacked Tuscany, and the king made him give up doing from that undertaking; for this reason the duke decided to be dependent on no more upon the arms and the happy chance of others.

For the first thing he made more feeble the Orsini and Colonnesi parties in Rome, by getting to himself all their supporters who were men of good birth, position, education, making them his men of good birth, position, education, giving them good money given for work, and, according to their position, giving great respect them with office and need in such a way that in a few months all feeling for to the self-interest (political) groups was made waste to and turned entirely to the duke. After this he was waiting an chance to crush the Orsini, having distributed widely the supporters of the Colonna house. This came to him soon and he used it well; for the Orsini, becoming conscious of at end to end that the aggrandizement of the duke and the Church was serious damage to them, called a meeting of the Magione in Perugia. From this sprung the war against authority at Urbino and the troubles in the Romagna, with without end dangers to the duke, all of which he overcame with the help of the French. Having made like new, healthy, normal his authority, not to let go of it at danger by having belief in either to the French or other outside forces, he had use of to his wiles, and he knew so well how to keep secret his mind that, by the bridging of Signor Pagolo -- whom the duke did not become feeble to not able to get loose with all kinds of attention, giving him money, clothing, and horses -- the Orsini were made ready to put up with, so that their condition of being simple brought them into his power at Sinigalia. Having destructed the firsts, and turned their supporters into his friends, the duke put down enough good bases to his power, having all the Romagna and the Duchy of Urbino; and the people now starting to value their well-to-do state, he gained them all over to himself. And as this point is good enough (for) of word that one is going, and to be copied by others, I am not ready to do to let go of it out.

Sinigalia, 31st December 1502.

When the duke took up the Romagna he discovered it under the rule of not so strong chiefs, rulers, persons in control, who rather take violently from their subjects than ruled them, and gave them more cause for separate than for coming together, so that the country was full of property-taking, violent argument, and every kind of violent acts; and so, desiring to take back peace and supporting orders to authority, he gave thought to as it necessary to give it a good governor. Then he gave a higher position Messer Ramiro d'Orco, a quick and smooth and cruel man, to whom he gave the fullest power. This man in a short time put back to earlier position peace and oneness with the greatest good outcome. After the duke gave thought to as that it was not wise to come together for discussion such more than enough authority, for he had no doubt but that he would become causing hate, so he put up a space with houses round of decision in the country, under a most very good, of highest quality President, wherein all cities had their gives support. And because he knew that the past being hard, cruel, serious had caused some feeling hate against himself, so, to clear himself in the minds of the persons in general, and profit them entirely to himself, he desired to make clear that, if any as cruel had been done frequently to become expert, it had not originated with him, but in the natural hardness of the head of town church. Under this false looks he took Ramiro, and one morning caused him to be put to death and left on the square at Cesena with the solid mass and a bloody knife at his side. The roughness of this interesting or surprising thing seen caused the people to be at once made free from doubt and in shocked surprise.

Ramiro d'Orco. Ramiro de Lorqua.

But let us come back from where we started. I say that the duke, discovering himself now enough powerful and partly got from nearest dangers by having armed himself in his own way, and having in a great measure crushed those forces in his round about that could damage him if he wished to go on (forward) with his get by force, had next to take into account France, for he knew that the king, who too late was having knowledge of his error, would not support him. And from this time he began to have a look for new agreement and to slow down with France in the journey for special purpose which she was making in the direction of the country with a king of Naples against the Spaniards who were keeping armies round to attack Gaeta. It was his purpose to safe, certain himself against them, and this he would have quickly able to do things well had Alexander lived.

Such was his line of acting in connection with present business. But in connection with the future he had to fear, in the first place, that a new agent coming after to the Church might not be friendly to him and might have a look for to take from him that which Alexander had given him, so he decided to act in four ways. Firstly, by destructing the families of those over much air of authority whom he had despoiled, so in connection with take away that trick reasons given from the Pope. Secondly, by getting to himself all the men of good birth, position, education of Rome, so in connection with be able to keep back (under control) the Pope with their help, as has been observed. Thirdly, by getting changed the college more to himself. Fourthly, by getting so much power before the Pope should come to an end that he could by his own measures stand against the first shock. Of these four things, at the death of Alexander, he had able to do things well three. For he had put to death as many of the property-less rulers as he could put hands on, and few had got away; he had won over the Roman men of good birth, position, education, and he had the most a great number of meeting of friends in the college. And in connection with any new getting, he put forward become chief of Tuscany, for he already had Perugia and Piombino, and Pisa was under his system of care for trade. And as he had no longer to learn from France (for the French were already driven out of the country with a king of Naples by the Spaniards, and in this way both were forced to give money for his goodwill), he jumped down upon Pisa. After this, Lucca and Siena gave in at once, partly through feeling hate and partly through fear of the Florentines; and the Florentines would have had no way of putting things right had he continued to do well, as he was doing well the year that Alexander came to an end, for he had gotten so much power and general opinion that he would have stood by himself, and no longer have depended on the happy chance and the forces of others, but one and only on his own power and ableness.

But Alexander died five years after he had first pulled the military blade. He left the duke with the nation of Romagna alone made into one, with the rest uncertain, between two most powerful violent armies, and ill to death. Yet there were in the duke such fearlessness an ableness, and he knew so well how men are to be won or lost, and so solid steps were the bases which in so short a time he had put, that if he had not had those armies on his back, or if he had been in good condition of body, he would have overcome all troubles. And it is seen that his bases were good, for the Romagna was waiting him for more than a month. In Rome, although but half living, he remained safe; and while the Baglioni, the Vitelli, and the Orsini might come to Rome, they could not effect anything against him. If he could not have made Pope him whom he desired, at least the one whom he did not desire would not have been selected. But if he had been in sound condition of body at the death of Alexander, everything would have been different to him. On the day that Julius the Second was selected, he told me that he had thought of everything that might take place at the death of his father, and had on condition that put things right for all, except that he had never saw what was coming that, when the death did come about, he himself would be on the point to come to an end.

Alexander VI died of overheated-body, 18th August 1503.

Julius II was Giuliano della Rovere, prince of church of San Pietro after Christ vincula3, born 1443, died 1513.

When all the actions of the duke are gave order to come back, I do not have knowledge how to make a protest of him, but rather it appears to be, as I have said, that I rightly would to offer him for a copy to all those who, by the great amount of money or the arms of others, are got lifted up, made higher to government. Because he, having a high true sense, right idea and outstretching directions, could not have kept control his acts, behavior in different conditions, and only the shortness of the living of Alexander and his own disease put stop to his designs. As an outcome of that, he who gives thought to it necessary to safe himself in his new principality, to get friends, to overcome either by force or false act or trick, to make himself loved one and feared by the persons in general, to be came after and respected by the military men, to destruct those who have power or reason to do damage him, to change the old order of things for new, to be serious and having pleasing way, magnanimous and open handed, to make waste an untrue army men and to make come into existence new, to be supporting friendship with kings and Princes in such a way that they must help him with great industry and wound (feeling) with make conscious of danger, cannot see a more full of force example than the actions of this man.

Only can he be made responsible for the selection of representative by persons of Julius the Second, in whom he made a bad selection, because, as is said, not being able to select a Pope to his own mind, he could have slowed down any other from being selected Pope; and he rightly would never to have gave agreement to the selection of representative by persons of any prince of church whom he had damaged or who had cause to fear him if they became pontiffs. For men damage either from fear or feeling hate. Those whom he had damaged, among others, were San Pietro after Christ vincula3, Colonna, San Giorgio, and Ascanio. The rest, in becoming Pope, had to fear him, Rouen and the Spaniards not took into account; the latter from their relation and debts, the former from his effect, the country with a king of France having relations with him. As an outcome of that, above everything, the duke rightly would to have made come into existence a Spaniard Pope, and, not making him, he rightly would to have gave agreement to Rouen and not San Pietro after Christ vincula3. He who believes that new benefits will cause great persons to overlook old injuries is tricked. As an outcome of that, the duke made an error in his selection, and it was the cause of his last serious damage.

San Giorgio is Raffaello Riario. Ascanio is Ascanio Sforza.


Chapter VIII -- having a part in those who have got a PRINCIPALITY by badness


Although a Prince may go higher from a private station in two ways, neither of which can be entirely given to great amount of money or powerful mind, yet it is clear to eye or mind to me that I must not be quiet, without sound on them, although one could be more greatly gave attention to when I have a discussion about nations with Presidents. These methods are when, either by some bad or very bad, wrong ways, one goes up to the principality, or when by the way of his fellow-citizens a private person becomes the Prince of his country. And wordusing of the first way, it will be picture-full by two examples -- one old, the other of the day -- and without going in, coming in farther into the field, I take into account these two examples will be enough those who may be forced to come after them.

Agathocles, the Sicilian, became King of Syracuse not only from a private but from a low and unhappy position. This man, the son of a potter, through all the changes in his great amount of money always led an shocking, disgusting living. Though that is so, he with his shocking acts with so much ableness of mind and body that, having loving himself to the military business, he rose through its ranks to be Praetor of Syracuse. being put up in that position, and having purposely came to a decision to make himself Prince and to get a grip by violent acts, without debt to others, that which had been gave way on to him by agreement, he came to a clear knowledge for this purpose with Amilcar, the Carthaginian, who, with his army, was fighting in Sicily. one morning he came together the people and the higher law-making group of Syracuse, as if he had to have a discussion with them things having a relation with to the nation with a President, and at a given sign the soldiers put to death all the senators and the with most money of the persons in general; these dead, he got and not gave way the princedom of that great town without any with good behavior outburst. And although he was twice sent the way by the Carthaginians, and lastly overcome with requests, yet not only was he able to keep safe his great town, but going away part of his men for its making attempt to keep from attack, with the others he attacked Africa, and in a short time got lifted up, made higher the take-over operations of Syracuse. The Carthaginians, made less to very much need, were forced to come to terms with Agathocles, and, letting go Sicily to him, had to be happy with the property of Africa.

Agathocles the Sicilian, born 361 B.C., died 289 B.C.

As an outcome of that, he who gives thought to the actions and the powerful mind of this man will see nothing, or little, which can be given to good chance event, inasmuch as he got to pre-eminence, as is made clear over, not by the kind act done on request of any one, but step by step in the military business, which steps were gained with a thousand troubles and great dangers, and were after well-marked gripped by him with many dangers. Yet it cannot be named being good to put to death fellow-citizens, to trick friends, to be without Faith, without kind feeling, behavior, without religion; such methods may get empire, but not respect given for great doings. Still, if the power of controlling fear of Agathocles in going in, coming in into and getting clear himself from dangers be gave thought to as, together with his being great of mind in going through, undergoing and overcoming hard times, it cannot be seen why he should be respected less than the most interesting/noted chief. though that is so, his rough as cruel and inhumanity with unlimited badness do not let him to be noted among the most very good, of highest quality men. What he achieved cannot be given either to good chance event or powerful mind.

In our times, during the rule of Alexander the being number six in line, Oliverotto da Fermo, having been left an without father or mother many years before, was brought up by his like a mother mother/father's brother, Giovanni Fogliani, and in the early days of his being young sent to fight under Pagolo Vitelli, that, being trained under his self control, he might get to some high position in the military business. After Pagolo came to an end, he fought under his brother Vitellozzo, and in a very short time, being gave power with bright ideas and a with force of body and mind, he became the first man in his business. But it seeming a little thing to work for under others, he came to a decision, with the help of some citizens of Fermo, to whom the use of persons as property of their country was dearer than its condition of being free, and with the help of the Vitelleschi, to get a grip Fermo. So he wrote to Giovanni Fogliani that, having been away from home for many years, he wished to go to him and his great town, and in some measure to look upon his property; and although he had not worked to become owner of anything except great respect, still, in order that the citizens should see he had not used up his time in pointless, he desired to come honorably, so would be with by one hundred horsemen, his friends and helpers; and he made a strong request to Giovanni to put in order that he should be received honorably by the Fermians, all of which would be not only to his great respect, but also to that of Giovanni himself, who had brought him up.

Giovanni, as an outcome of that, did not become feeble in any attentions in debt to his brother's (sister's) son, and he caused him to be honorably received by the Fermians, and he put him in his own house, where, having passed some days, and having put in order what was necessary for his bad designs, Oliverotto gave a serious public meal to which he made request to come to Giovanni Fogliani and the chiefs of Fermo. When the (good) food and all the other amusement that are general in such public meals were made complete, Oliverotto artfully began certain serious talks, wordusing of the being great of Pope Alexander and his son Cesare, and of their undertakings, to which talk Giovanni and others answered; but he rose at once, saying that such matters rightly would to be had a discussion in a more private place, and he took up himself to a room, where to Giovanni and the rest of the citizens went in after him. No sooner were they seated than soldiers gave out from secret places and killed Giovanni and the rest. After these crimes of causing the death of persons Oliverotto, got on on horseback, went on (transport) up and down the town and overcome with requests the chief law judge in the great building of a ruler, so that in fear the people were forced to do as ordered him, and to form a government, of which he made himself the Prince. He put to death all the unhappy persons who were able to damage him, and made stronger himself with new behavior and military orders, in such a way that, in the year during which he kept the principality, not only was he safe, certain in the great town of Fermo, but he had become to be feared to all his persons living near. And his destruction would have been as hard as that of Agathocles if he had not let himself to be overstretched by Cesare Borgia, who took him with the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia, as was stated over. Thus one year after he had made oneself responsible this father-killing, he was killed through gripping throat, together with Vitellozzo, whom he had made his chief in free from fear and badness.

Some may question how it can come about that Agathocles, and his like, after unlimited treacheries and cruel acts, should live for long safe, certain in his country, and keep from attack from outside persons hated against, and never be conspired against by his own persons having rights in the nation; seeing that many others, with the help of as cruel, have never been able even in peaceful times to keep the state, still less in the feeling doubt times of war. I have belief that this follows from punishments being badly or rightly used. Those may be named rightly used, if of wrongdoing it is possible to say well, that are put to use at one blow and are necessary to one's safety, and that are not kept on in after unless they can be turned to the better chance of the persons. The badly used are those which, though they may be few in the start, increasing in number with time rather than drop. Those who experience the first system are able, by help of God or man, to make better in some degree their rule, as Agathocles did. It is not possible for those who come after the other to be supporting themselves.

Mr Burd suggests that this word probably comes near the of the day equal of Machiavelli's thought when he says, makes statement of "crudelta" than the more clearly and readily seen "cruel acts."

For this reason it is to be remarked that, in getting a nation, the place-taker rightly would to be looking at closely into all those injuries which it is necessary for him to give (pain), and to do them all at one blow so as not to have to do over and over them daily; and thus by not unsettling men he will be able to give certainty to them, and get them to himself by helps. He who does in different conditions, either from being fearful or wrongdoing opinion, is always forced to keep the knife in his hand; neither can he have belief on his persons, nor can they join themselves to him, being in debt to their continued and redone wrongs. For injuries rightly would to be done all at one time, so that, being tasted less, they wound (feeling) less; benefits rightly would to be given little by little, so that the taste of them may last longer.

And above all things, a Prince rightly would to live among his people in such a way that no sudden conditions, whether of good or wrongdoing, shall make him change; because if the need for this comes in troubled times, you are too late for hard measures; and not strong ones will not help you, for they will be gave thought to as forced from you, and no one will be under any debt to you for them.


Chapter IX -- about a not military PRINCIPALITY


But coming to the other point -- where a leading person having rights in the nation becomes the Prince of his country, not by badness or any disgusting violent acts, but by the given approval, support of his person citizens -- this may be named a not military principality: nor is powerful mind or great amount of money completely necessary to get to it, but rather a happy sharpness. I say then that such a principality is got either by the way of the people or by the way of the people of high birth. Because in all cities these two with points different parties are based, and from this it comes about that the people do not desire to be ruled nor kept under by force by the persons of high birth, and the persons of high birth desire to rule and be ruling cruelly the persons in general; and from these two opposite desires there comes about in cities one of three outcome, either a principality, self-government, or without government.

A principality is made come into existence either by the people or by the persons of high birth, as agreement as one or other of them has the chance; for the persons of high birth, seeing they cannot put up with the persons in general, begin to cry up the general opinion of one of themselves, and they make him a Prince, so that under his person with another they can give (small) outlet to their desires. The persons in general, discovering they cannot stand against the persons of high birth, also cry up the general opinion of one of themselves, and make him a Prince so in connection with be kept from attack by his authority. He who gets power to rule by the help of the persons of high birth maintains himself with more trouble than he who comes to it by the help of the persons in general, because the former gets himself with many around him who take into account themselves his equals, and because of this he can neither rule nor manage them to his liking. But he who reaches power to rule by pleasing to all gets himself by oneself, and has none around him, or small number, who are not got ready to do as ordered him.

In addition to this, one cannot by equal doing trade (in), and without physical damage to others, please the persons of high birth, but you can free from doubt the persons in general, for their purpose is more righteous than that of the persons of high birth, the latter desiring to be ruling cruelly, while the former only desire not to be kept under by force. It is to be added also that a Prince can never safe himself against a violent persons in general, because of their being too a great number of, while from the persons of high birth he can safe, certain himself, as they are few in number. The worst that a Prince may hope for from a violent people is to be let go by them; but from violent persons of high birth he has not only to fear giving up, but also that they will get up against him; for they, being in these affairs more far-seeing and with a quick mind, always come forward in time to keep from destruction themselves, and to get kind acts from him whom they hope for to overcome. In addition, the Prince is forced to live always with the same persons in general, but he can do well without the same persons of high birth, being able to make and unmake them daily, and to give or take away authority when it pleases him.

As an outcome of that, to make this point clearer, I say that the persons of high birth rightly would to be looked at mainly in two ways: that is to say, they either form their direction taken in such a way as makes necessary to them entirely to your good chance event, or they do not. Those who so make necessary to themselves, and are not forcefully taking, rightly would to be given great respect and loved; those who do not make necessary to themselves may be dealt with in two ways; they may become feeble to do this through pusillanimity and a natural need of power of controlling fear, in which example you rightly would to make use of them, especially of those who are of good man of law; and in this way, while in well-to-do state you great respect them, in bad times you do not have to fear them. But when for their own strongly desiring ends they keep clear of necessary themselves, it is a things like money that they are giving more thought to themselves than to you, and a Prince rightly would to watchman against such, and to fear them as if they were open persons hated against, because in bad times they always help to serious damage him.

As an outcome of that, one who becomes a Prince through the give approval, support of the people rightly would to keep them friendly, and this he can easily do seeing they only request not to be kept under by force by him. But one who, in being against to the persons in general, becomes a Prince by the give approval, support of the persons of high birth, rightly would, above everything, to have a look for to get the people over to himself, and this he may easily do if he takes them under his care. Because men, when they get good from him of whom they were ready to wrongdoing, are joined more closely to their kind helper; thus the people quickly become more loving to him than if he had been got lifted up, made higher to the principality by their kind acts; and the Prince can come out best their kind feelings in many ways, but as these (make, become, be) different according to the circumstances one cannot give fixed rules, so I not put in them; but, I say over and over, it is necessary for a Prince to have the people friendly, otherwise he has no safety in bad times.

Nabis, Prince of the Spartans, undergone the attack of all Greece, and of a top-acting Roman army, and against them he kept from attack his country and his government; and for the overcoming of this great danger it was only necessary for him to make himself safe, certain against a small number, but this would not have been enough had the people been violent. And do not let anyone fight against this statement with the common, uninteresting old saying that "He who puts up (a building) on the persons in general, puts up (a building) on the wet dust or earth," for this is true when a private person having rights in the nation makes a start there, and gets to himself that the people will free him when he is kept under by force by his persons hated against or by the law judge; wherein he would see himself very often tricked, as happened to the Gracchi in Rome and to Messer Giorgio Scali in Florence. But looked on as certain a Prince who has made certain himself as over, who can order, and is a man of power of controlling fear, unsurprised in bad times, who does not become feeble in other training and so on making able to do something, and who, by his decision and energy, keeps the complete body people gave support to -- such a one will never see himself tricked in them, and it will be made clear that he has put down his bases well.

Nabis, cruel ruler of Sparta, overcame by the Romans under Flamininus in 195 B.C. ; put to death 192 B.C.

Messer Giorgio Scali. This event is to be discovered in Machiavelli's "Florentine History," Book III.

These King’s son lands are responsible to danger when they are going past, through from the not military to the unlimited order of government, for such Princes either rule personally or through law judge. In the latter example their government is more feeble and more not safe, because it rests entirely on the goodwill of those citizens who are got lifted up, made higher to the judge position, and who, especially in troubled times, can put an end to the government with great comfort, either by secret designs or open being openly against authority; and the Prince has not the chance among troubles to use complete authority, because the citizens and persons, gotten used to get orders from law judge, are not of a mind to do as ordered him among these without order, and there will always be in feeling doubt times a little amount of men whom he can belief. For such a Prince cannot have belief in upon what he observes in quiet times, when citizens have need of the nation, because then everyone is in agreement with him; they all undertake to, and when death is far away they all desire to come to an end for him; but in troubled times, when the state has need of its persons having rights in the nation, then he gets but small number. And so much the more is this test dangerous, inasmuch as it can only be tested once. As an outcome of that a wise Prince rightly would to take up such a direction that his citizens will always in every sort and kind of condition have need of the nation and of him, and then he will always get them true to.


Chapter X -- about the way in which the power of all KING’S SON LANDS rightly would be measured


It is necessary to take into account another point in putting questions to the special mark of these King’s son lands: that is, whether a Prince has such power that, if needed, he can support himself with his own gets support, or whether he has always need of the help of others. And to make this quite clear I say that I take into account those who are able to support themselves by their own resources who tin, either by very much of men or money, produce a enough army to join fight against anyone who comes to attack them; and I take into account those always to have need of others who cannot make clear to themselves against the person hated in the field, but are forced to keep safe themselves by keeping safe behind walls. The first example has been had a discussion, but we will say of it again should it come back in thought. In the second example one can say nothing except to give support to such Princes to get ready and make stronger their towns, and not on any account to keep safe the country. And whoever shall make stronger his town well, and shall have managed the other business houses of his subjects in the way stated over, and to be often redone, will never be attacked without great conscious of danger, for men are always going against to undertakings where difficulties can be seen, and it will be seen not to be an simple, not hard thing to attack one who has his town well made stronger, and is not hated by his persons in general.

The cities of Germany are completely free, they own but little country around them, and they give in supporting orders to the great ruler when it suits them, nor do they fear this or any other power they may have near them, because they are made stronger in such a way that everyone thinks the taking of them by attack would be seeming long (slow) and hard, seeing they have right (field) drains and walls, they have enough powerful wheeled guns, and they always keep in public depots enough for one year's taking of food, drinking, and firing. And beyond this, to keep the people quiet and without loss to the nation, they always have the means of giving work to the town in those works that are the living and power of the great town, and on the going after of which the people are supported; they also keep military uses in general view, and in addition have many orders to uphold them.

As an outcome of that, a Prince who has a strong great town, and had not made himself causing hate, will not be attacked, or if anyone should attack he will only be driven off with shame; again, because that the affairs of this everywhere are so changeable, it is almost not possible to keep an army a complete year in the field without being got in the way with. And whoever should (give) answer: If the people have property outside the great town, and see it burnt, they will not keep putting up with things, and the long take-over operations and self-interest will make them overlook their Prince; to this I answer that a powerful and fearless Prince will overcome all such difficulties by giving at one time hope to his subjects that the wrongdoing will not be for long, at another time fear of the as cruel of the person hated, then keeping safe himself expertly from those subjects who seem to him to be too well-marked.

In addition, the person hated would naturally on his getting in at once burn and serious damage the country at the time when the frame of mind of the people are still burning taste and ready for the making attempt to keep from attack; and, as an outcome of that, so much the less rightly would the Prince to be unready; because after a time, when frame of mind have made less warm, the damage is already done, the ills are caused, and there is no longer any way of putting things right; and therefore they are so much the more ready to put together with their Prince, he seeming to be under obligations to them now that their houses have been burnt and their property given to destruction in his attempt to keep from attack. For it is the nature of men to be joined by the benefits they give as much as by those they get. As an outcome of that, if everything is well gave thought to as, it will not be hard for a wise Prince to keep the minds of his citizens tight from first to last, when he does not become feeble to support and keep them safe.


Chapters 11 to 20