Taking as probable that truth is a woman - what then? is there not land for having feelings that it is probable that all teachers interested in the why of existence in so far as they have been forceful believers, have failed to get women clearly -- that the very great seriousness and badly made badly-timed acts with which they have usually undergone punishment for their addresses to truth have been untrained and unseemly methods for getting a woman? Certainly, she has never let herself to be won and now every kind of forceful belief stands with sad and hopeless looks -- if in fact it stands at all. For there are amusement-making fools who support that it has fallen, that all forceful belief lies on the land -- no more, that it is at its last quick, short breath. But to talk seriously there are good grounds for hoping that all forceful belief-making in reasoning about existence, whatever serious, whatever doubtless and decided airs it has taken to be true, may have been only a kind childish behavior and starting state; and probably the time is at hand when it will be once and again clear about what has actually were enough for the base of such important looking and unlimited reasoning buildings as the forceful believers have till now put up: perhaps some pleasing to all untrue beliefs of long-gone time (such as the seat-of-feeling untrue belief which in the form of person–and-self untrue belief have not yet stopped doing damage): perhaps some play upon words, a trick on the part of rules of language or a chance-taking without fear generality of very limited very personal very man-like all too man-like facts. The reasoning about existence of the forceful believers, it is to be hoped, was only an undertaking for thousands of years after as was astrology in still earlier times, in the support of which probably more work, gold, sharpness and power of waiting have been given than on any true, in fact science till now: we be in debt to it and to its “super-terrestrial” desires in Asia and Egypt, the chief, great, important look, way of buildings and structure design. It seems that in order to write themselves upon the heart of all persons as a group with going on for ever claims, all great things have first to go from place to place about the earth as great and fear-firing pictures with chief points overdone: forceful, authoritative reasoning about existence has been a picture with chief points overdone of this kind - for example, the Vedanta body of teaching in Asia and Platonism in Europe. Let us not be unkind to it, although it must certainly be confessed that the worst, the most trouble-giving and the most dangerous of errors till now has been a forceful belief error - namely Plato's invention of clear true sense, right idea and the Good in itself. But now when it has been overcome, when Europe, sent away of this causing of fear, can again give a pull to breath freely and at least get pleasure out of a healthier sleep, we, whose right thing to do is wakefulness itself, are those with rights in family line of all the power which the competition against this error has made stronger. It amounted to the very being upside down of truth, and the words saying not true of the view - the deep condition - of existence, to talk of thought source and the Good as Plato spoke of them; in fact one might question as a medical man: "How did such a disease attack that finest product of days long past, Plato? Had the bad Socrates really made him go bad? Was Socrates at the end a maker of wrongdoers of young persons, and would be right for his punishment?" But the competition against Plato, or - to talk more clearly, and for the "persons in general" - the competition against the church-related keeping under by force of thousands of years of Christianity (for the religion of Christ is Platonism for the "persons in general"), produced in Europe a great strong feeling of seat of feeling, such as had not had existence anywhere earlier; with such a tightly stretched, pulled arch one can now direct at the farthest ends, purposes. As a field of interest of fact, the European feels this strong feeling as a state of trouble, and twice attempts have been made in chief, great, important look, way to stiff the arch: once with the help of Jesuitism, and the second time with the help of rights-giving wisdom - which, with the help of condition of being free of the newspapers generally and newspaper-reading, may in fact, take it about that the purpose would not so easily discover itself in "trouble"! (The Germans invented gunpowder -- all credit to them! but they again made things square -- they invented printing.) But we, who are neither Jesuits, nor rights-supporting persons, nor even enough Germans, we good Europeans, and free, very free in frame of mind -- we have it still, all the trouble of purpose and all the strong feeling of its arch! And perhaps also the arrow, the right thing to do and, who has knowledge? The end, purpose to direct at… Sils Maria Upper Engadine, JUNE, 1885.
Starting opinions of teachers interested in the why of existence
1. The Will to truth, which is to cause us desires to many a dangerous undertaking, the great, greatly respected truthfulness of which all teachers interested in the why of existence have till now talked with respect, what questions has this Will to truth not put down before us! What strange, troubling, uncertain questions! It is already a long story; still it seems as if it were hardly started. Is it any strange event if we at last grow with doubts about, not keep power of waiting, and turn without the power of waiting away? That this Sphinx teaches us at last to question ourselves? Who is it really that puts questions to us here? What really is this "Will to truth" in us? In fact we made a long stop at the question in connection with the start of this Will -- till at last we came to an unlimited stop before a still more important question. We questioned about the value of this Will. Given agreement that we need the truth: why not desire untruth? And uncertainty? Even being without knowledge? The hard question of the value of truth presented itself before us -- or was it we who presented ourselves before the hard question? Which of us is the Oedipus here? Which the Sphinx? It would seem to be a meeting of questions and notes of questioning. And could it had belief in that it at last seems to us as if the hard question had not ever been put forward before, as if we were the first to make it out, get a view of it, and take a chance of getting it up, make it higher? For there is danger in getting it up, make it higher, possibly there is no greater danger. 2. "How was anything start out of its opposite? for example, truth out of error? or the Will to truth out of the will to trick? Or kind acts out of self-interested attitude? Or the clear sun-bright vision of the wise man out of wrongful desires? Such genesis is not possible; whoever has uncontrolled thoughts of it is a foolish person, no, worse than a foolish person; things of the highest value have to have a different start, a start of their own -- in this for a short time attraction-using, illusory, little space in this trouble of delusion and great love for money, they cannot have their starting point. But more like in the legs-top of Being, in the unchanging, in the kept-secret highest being, in the 'Thing-in-itself -- there have to be their starting point, and nowhere other!" -- This form of reasoning moves to light the starting opinion by which metaphysicians of all times can be took in, this form of valuation is at the back of all their reasoning way; through this "belief" of theirs, they put power into themselves for their "knowledge," for something that is in the end seriously named as "the truth." The deep belief of metaphysicians is the belief in antitheses of values. It not ever came to mind even to the slowest-going with care of them to doubt here on the very edge (where doubt, however, was most necessary); though they had made a serious undertaking, "de omnibus dubitandum." For it may be doubted, firstly, if antitheses have existence at all; and secondly, if the pleasing to all valuations and antitheses of value upon which metaphysicians have put their sign of office, are not possibly only not deep value statements, views for the time only, in addition to being probably made from some angle, possibly from below -- "small jumping animal living on land and water (frog) views," as it were, to get use of a saying current among painters. In though weighted by all the value which may be the property of to the true, the certain and the kind, it may be possible that a higher and more important value for existence generally rightly would be given to trick, to the will to false ideas, to self-interested attitudes, and great love for money. It may even be possible that what forms the value of those good and respected things, is chiefly through details in their being secretly related, knotted, and ornamented cloth-worked to these wrongdoing and seemingly opposite things -- possibly even in being necessarily the same with them. Possibly! But who desires to trouble himself with such dangerous "Possiblies"! For that research one have to be waiting for the coming of a new order of teachers interested in the why of existence, such as will have other tastes and tendencies, the opposite of those till now generally seen-- teachers interested in the why of existence of the dangerous "possibly" in every sense of the word. And to talk in all seriousness, I see such new teachers interested in the why of existence starting to come into view. 3. Having kept a sharp eye on teachers interested in the why of existence, and having read between their lines long enough, I now say to myself that the greater part of conscious having thoughts have to be added among the natural purposes, uses, and it is so even in the example of reasoning having thoughts; one has here to learn again, as one learned again about qualities given to offspring and "birth-given qualities." As little as the act of birth comes into thought in the complete process and way of qualities given to offsprings, just as little is "being-conscious" opposite to the natural in any outcome forming sense; the greater part of the conscious thoughts of a philosopher is secretly effected by his natural impulses, and forced into certain and clear narrow ways. And at the back of all reasoning and its seeming power to rule of moving, there are valuations, or to talk more clearly, physiological requests by right, for the support of a certain and clear form of existence. For example, that the certain is of value more than the uncertain, that illusion is less of great value than "truth" such valuations, in though weighted by of their regulative importance for us, may though be only not deep valuations, special kinds of activities, such as may be necessary for the support of beings such as ourselves. Taking as probable, in effect, that man is not just the "measure of things." 4. The falseness of an opinion is not for us any stopping reason to it: it is here, possibly, that our new language sounds most strangely. The question is, how far an opinion is life-farthering, life-keeping, living-sort-keeping, possibly living-sort-caring, and we are importantly with a tendency to support that the most false opinions (to which the produced by uniting decisions a priori are right for), are the most necessary to us, that without a recognition of fictions with power of reasoning rightly, without a comparison of material fact with the only seen in one's mind space of the unlimited and unchangeable, without an unchanging false-copying of the earth with the help of numbers, man could not live -- that the giving-up of false opinions would be a giving-up of existence, an opposite-making of existence. To take in untruth as a condition of existence; that is certainly to fight against the old and wise ideas of value in a dangerous way, and reasoning about existence which takes a chance to do so, has in that way by oneself placed itself farther than good and wrongdoing. 5. That which causes teachers interested in the why of existence to be looked upon half- having doubts about and half-laughing, is not the frequently-done discovery of how pointless they are -- how frequently and easily they make errors and not keep their way, in short, how foolish and young-like they are, -- but that there is not enough upright, true trading with them, in view of the fact that they all produce a loud and of good qualities outcry when the hard question of truthfulness is even given small sign of in the far away way. They all take up a position as though their true opinions had been discovered and got to through the self-becoming of a cold, unmixed, as by a higher being interest-less dialectic (in comparison to all sorts of secret beliefs experts, who, lighter and foolisher, talk of “impulse for doing”), in view of the fact that, in fact, a bad feeling statement, idea, or "suggestion," which is generally their heart's desire made short and polished, is kept from attack by them with arguments looked out for after the event. They are all supporters who do not desire to be looked upon as such, generally quick-minded supporters, in addition, of their starting opinions, which they name "facts," -- and very far from having the sense of right and wrong which without fearing lets in this to itself, very far from having the good taste of the power of controlling fear which goes so far as to let this be got clearly, possibly to suggest to friend or person hated, or in happy self-belief and self-foolishness. The bright event of the two-facedness of old Kant, equally stiff and quite good, with which he gets us into the dialectic by-ways that lead (more correctly mislead) to his "unlimited importance" -- makes us delicately-tasteful ones smile, we who discover no small amusement in getting facts secretly out the hard to see clearly tricks of old self-righteous ones and right-behavior views-giving persons. Or, still more so, the tricking in mathematics form, with the help of which Spinoza has, as it were, clothed his reasoning about existence in post and face covering -- in fact, the "love of his wise material," to make clear the words equally and squarely -- in order in that way to cause great fear at once into the heart of the attacker who rightly would have no fear to give a quick look on that very strong unmarried woman, that Pallas Athene: -- how much of personal fearfulness and feebleness does this dance with face coverings of an unhealthy keeping-away person turning! 6. It has gradually become clear to me what every great reasoning about existence up till now has formed of -- namely, the statement of wrongdoing of its first starter, and a living sort of automatic and unconscious self-story; and in addition that the right and wrong (or with no sense of shame) purpose in every reasoning about existence has made up the true full of force germ 1 out of which the complete plant has always grown. In fact, to get clearly how the most hard-to-get metaphysical 2 statements of a philosopher 3 have been arrived at, it is always well (and wise) to first question oneself: "what belief in right behavior do they (or does he) directed at?" As agreement, I do not have belief in that a "impulse to knowledge" is the father of reasoning about existence; but that another impulse, here as in another place, has only made use of knowledge (and in error knowledge!) as an instrument. But whoever gives thought to as the deep impulses of man with a view to working out how far they may have here acted as giving the impulse for doing powerfully minded persons (or as bad beings and small bad beings), will discover that they have all done expertly reasoning about existence at one time or another, and that each one of them would have been only too pleased, happy to look upon itself as the last end of existence and the within the law ruler over all the other impulses. For every impulse is high-handed, and as such, attempts to work out. To be safe, in the example of learners, in the example of really science-wise men, it may be otherwise -- "better," if you will; there there may really be such a thing as an "impulse to knowledge," some kind of small, independent clockwork, which, when well wound up, works away in a hard-working way to that end, without the rest of the by learning impulses taking any material part there in. The current "interests" of the learner of letters, as an outcome of that, are generally in quite another direction -- in the family, possibly, or in money-making, or in political work; it is, in fact, almost not very good at what point of research his little machine is placed, and whether the hopeful young worker becomes a good philologist, an earth growth commonly taking the form of a round roof on a stem expert, or a chemist; he is not made out by becoming this or that. In the philosopher 3, on the opposite, there is completely nothing to do with no one person; and above all, his belief in right behavior gives a decided and outcome forming statements in connection with WHO HE IS, -- that is to say, in what order the deepest impulses of his nature be positioned to each other. 7. How bad philosophers 1 can be! I have knowledge of nothing more sharp than the thing said or done in sport, to get a laugh Epicurus took the Liberty of making on Plato and the Platonists; he called them Dionysiokolakes. In its first form sense, and on the face of it, the word has the sense of "ones saying over-kind things of Dionysius" -- as an outcome of that, cruel rulers' additions and mouth-water touching one; in addition to this, however, it is as much in connection with say, "they are all acting persons, there is nothing true about them" (for Dionysiokolax was a pleasing to all name for an acting person). And the latter is really the damaging say something against that Epicurus formed upon Plato: he was in a bad state of mind by the most important, great ways, the “put in place” polished and tasteful form of which Plato and his learners were chiefs, rulers in control -- of which Epicurus was not a chief! He, the old school-teacher of Samos, who sat kept secret in his little garden at Athens, and wrote three hundred books, perhaps out of violently angry and strongly desiring desire to have what another has of Plato, who has knowledge! Greece took a hundred years to get out who the garden high being Epicurus really was. did she ever discover out things? 8. There is a point in every philosophy 1 at which the "strong belief" of the philosopher 2 appears on the place; or, to put it in the words of an old unclear event: Adventavit asinus, Pulcher et fortissimus. 9. You Desire to live "in harmony with to nature"? surprise!, you high and good Stoics, what trick of words! have an idea of to yourselves a being like nature, unlimited wasting, unlimited uninterested, without purpose or thought, without regret or right, at once fruitful and unfertile and uncertain: have an idea of to yourselves no interest as a power -- how was you able to live in agreement with such no interest? To live -- is not that just attempting to be otherwise than this nature? Is not living valuing, putting before, being unjust, being limited, attempting to be different? And given agreement that your necessary, "living according to nature," means actually the same as "living according to existence" -- how could you do differently? Why should you make a sense out of what you yourselves are, and must be? In material fact, however, it is quite otherwise with you: while you make oneself seem to read with great pleasure the Canon of your law in nature, you need something quite the opposite, you special stage-players and self-tricksters! In your pleasurably feel you desire to say words to be taken down your behavior related to right and wrong and high purposes to nature, to nature herself, and to make them into one there in; you request strongly that it shall be nature "in harmony with to the covered walkway," and would like everything to be made after your own image, as a sizeable, endless overmuch respected and most general form of Stoicism! With all your love for truth, you have forced yourselves so long, so regularly, and with such sleep-causing stiffness to see nature falsely, that is to say, Stoically, that you are no longer able to see it otherwise -- and to top all, some unmeasurable airs-giving gives you the foolish hope that BECAUSE you are able to make cruel use of rule over yourselves -- Stoicism is self-cruelness -- nature will also let herself to be make cruel use of rule over: is not the Stoic a PART of nature? . . . But this is an old and going on for ever story: what happened in old times with the Stoics still happens today, as Soon as ever a reasoning about existence begins to have belief in itself. It always makes come into existence the everywhere on earth in its own image; it can not do in different conditions; reasoning about existence is this cruel impulse itself, the most body-less will to Power, the will to "coming to living of the everywhere on earth," the will to the causa prima. 10. The readiness and a complex, delicate way, I should even say tricks-bound thought, with which the hard question of "the true and the clear everywhere on earth" is dealt with now throughout Europe, gives food for thought and attention; and he who hears only a "Will to truth" in the back, and nothing else, can not certainly take credit of the sharpest ears. In uncommon and separate examples, it may really have happened that such a will to truth -- a certain more than enough and ready for experience fearlessness, a metaphysician 1's desire to go far of the with-friends-gone hope -- has took part there in: that which in the end always puts before a small number of "certainty" to a complete work cart-amount of beautiful possible states; there may even be narrow-viewing thoughtless supporters of sense of right and wrong, who have a better opinion to put their last belief in a safe nothing, rather than in an uncertain something. But that is Nihilism, and the sign of a giving up hope, death-bound tired person with some quality in marked degree, even taking into account the fearless directing such a good qualities may put on view. It seems, however, to be otherwise with stronger and forceful those sharp using their minds who are still ready for existence. In that they side AGAINST looks, and talk with high airs of "view," in that they degree the being able to have belief in of their own bodies about as low as the being able to have belief in of the by-eye facts supporting that "the earth stands still," and in this way, seemingly, letting with over-pleasing with oneself their most safe property to get away (for what does one now have belief in more firmly than in one's body? ) , -- who knows if they are not really attempting to come out best back something which was formerly an even more safe control, something of the old lands ruled over of the true to ones word of former times, perhaps the "living forever seat of feeling," perhaps "the old highest being," in short, ideas by which they could live better, that is to say, more strongly and more with pleasure, than by "of-the-day ideas"? There is doubts of these of-the-day ideas in this form of looking at things, a condition of unbelief in all that has been made yesterday and today; there is perhaps some small, little mix of end and low opinion, which can no longer have ongoing existence the mixed ornaments of ideas of the most full of changes place of birth, such as so-named positivism 2 now forcefully sends available; a disgust of the more polished taste at the Village-Fair mixing and loose parts joining of all these untrue philosophers, in whom there is nothing either new or true, except this mixing. There in it seems to me that we should be in agreement with those doubting ones against facts and persons looking at knowledge in detail of the present day; their natural impulse, which sends them back from of-the-day material fact, is not made clear to be wrong . . . what do their slow-minded person by-paths trouble us! The main thing about them is NOT that they desire to go "back," but that they desire to get away there from. A little MORE power, go, power of controlling fear, and able-at-art power, and they would be OFF -- and not back!